Cambridge : Cambridge University Press Goodhart, Arthur L.
1931, Essays in jurisprudence and the common law / by Arthur L.
Juris is the genitive form of jus meaning law, and prudentia means prudence (also: discretion, foresight, forethought, circumspection.
It refers to the exercise of good judgment, common sense, and caution, especially in the conduct of practical matters.
I welcome this opportunity of thanking my colleagues that School for the hospitality and courtesy they showed me during that very pleasant year.
I wish to acknowledge the debt I owe to Professor W. In the first one the point at issue is considered from the standpoint of the English authorities, while in the second the emphasis is placed on the American cases and literature. Mc Nair for the valuable advice and help they have given me; they are, of course, not responsible for,nor do they always agree with, the views I have expressed in these articles. Four of these papers were written during the time when I was visiting Professor at the School of Law, Yale University, 1928 1929. This article addresses three distinct branches of thought in general jurisprudence.Ancient natural law is the idea that there are rational objective limits to the power of legislative rulers.The sentences of the iudex were supposed to be simple interpretations of the traditional customs, but—apart from considering what traditional customs applied in each case—soon developed a more equitable interpretation, coherently adapting the law to newer social exigencies.The law was then adjusted with evolving institutiones (legal concepts), while remaining in the traditional mode.Ancient Indian jurisprudence is mentioned in various Dharmaśāstra texts, starting with the Dharmasutra of Bhodhayana.Jurisprudence in Ancient Rome had its origins with the (periti)—experts in the jus mos maiorum (traditional law), a body of oral laws and customs.It espouses the use of a neutral point of view and descriptive language when referring to aspects of legal systems.It encompasses such theories of jurisprudence as "legal positivism", which holds that there is no necessary connection between law and morality and that the force of law comes from basic social facts; and "legal realism", which argues that the real-world practice of law determines what law is, the law having the force that it does because of what legislators, lawyers, and judges do with it.